Addressing Climate-related Security Risks: Towards a Programme for Action

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Executive Summary

Within the multilateral system, there is increasing interest in exploring how climate change risks interact with other factors – including livelihoods, gender inequality and women’s rights, conflict, migration and displacement, social exclusion, and wider security issues. In particular, policymakers and practitioners have intensified efforts to improve cross-cutting analytic and foresight capabilities, along with more climate-sensitive programming.

This interest is reflected in growing scientific literature, but also across governments and international organisations. Many bilateral donors have initiated new programmes, initiatives, and institutions focused on how climate change erodes resilience in fragile countries. Engagement at the multilateral level has also been prominent, with several UN Security Council (UNSC) debates on the issue as well as initiatives such as the establishment of the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), which increase UN institutional capacity to deal with climate-related security risks.1 The ways in which environmental changes impact the Sustainable Development Goals and the work of the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus are increasingly important to the UN and its partners. In this context, several governments have stressed the need for greater research and

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1 We understand climate-related security risks as systemic risks that emerge through complex interactions between climate change and different social, economic, environmental, demographic and political factors. They are driven by one or more climatic stressors that have certain direct and/or indirect impacts on human security and challenge the peace and stability of states and societies (Detges et al., 2020).
thinking about how climate change interacts with insecurity and peace, and how programming and policymaking can better reflect and address these dynamics.  

This policy paper responds to that demand, exploring some of the emerging approaches to analysing and responding to climate-related security risks. It is based on discussions amongst bilateral and multilateral development agencies held at the development-focused session of the three-part Climate Security in 3D series, organised on 24 March 2021 by Wilton Park and adelphi, with the support of the UK Government and Weathering Risk. Supplementary information was gathered through desk-based research and 12 interviews conducted with climate and conflict advisers in relevant governments and donor organisations.

The event highlighted the growing relevance of climate-security at the policy and programmatic levels, alongside a growing willingness by the UNSC and other multilateral forums to discuss the links between climate change and security risks. An emerging focus on preventive action – including through better use of data, cross-border programming, and improved risk management – proves that climate-security is gaining traction across the multilateral system. Despite this increasing recognition, many states have not translated climate-security into programmatic responses, due in part to financial and human resources constraints, but also due to broader political obstacles. Moreover, issues of inclusion – in particular around gender – are far from fully addressed in national programming.

Based on the conference discussion, we suggest that bilateral and multilateral donors and governments take the following steps to deliver on the climate-security agenda:

- Move towards integrated strategies that deliver on both climate resilience and peace;
- Focus on inclusion and social transformation;
- Develop multi-scalar strategies that address local, national, and regional dynamics together;
- Invest more in learning and capacity-building;
- Frame climate-security as a clear complement to the broader climate change discussion.

By integrated programming we refer here to programming that simultaneously contributes to climate adaptation, resilience-building and peacebuilding, with a focus on climate-vulnerable and fragile and conflict-affected contexts.
1. Understanding climate-related security risks

The relevance of climate-related security risks at the multilateral level and in major donor government’s strategies and programming is increasing.

Scientific evidence on the linkages between climate change, peace and security has grown in recent years, alongside an increasing manifestation and visibility of climate-related security risks in reality. These parallel trends have underlined that climate change can exacerbate security risks and, as such, demands the attention of political actors beyond the environmental sector. This has influenced both multilateral and national agendas.

At the multilateral level, the frequency of conversations on climate-related security risks has markedly increased, including in the UNSC. Despite varying levels of opposition by China, Russia, and the previous US administration (which have thus far prevented a broad resolution on the climate-conflict nexus), the UNSC has acknowledged the role of climate change in driving insecurity in Mali, Sudan, and Somalia. This has led to regular reporting by the UN’s regional envoy to West Africa and the Sahel, and has prompted more frequent climate-security discussions in the Council in recent years.

Importantly, the UN has also increased its own capacities in the climate-security sphere. Supported initially by Sweden in 2018, a cross-departmental Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) was established to help the UN system more systematically address climate-related security risks and devise prevention and management strategies (see box 1). The newly formed Development Coordination Office has encouraged UN country offices around the world to include climate-security in their Common Country Analyses and development programming, while UN peace operations have increasingly worked to build climate-sensitive approaches to their interventions.³

At the national level, units focusing on climate change have been created in multiple Ministries of Foreign Affairs, including the UK, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and the European External Action Service. Conflict- and climate-sensitivity are increasingly recognised as important programme components, and overseas development strategies are being designed with climate and security in mind, as in the case of the Danish strategy for development cooperation (“World 2030”) (DANIDA, 2017). Interest in context-specific analysis is also growing, with multiple governments (e.g. UK, Germany, Norway) funding applied research on climate security. Finally, actors and stakeholders from fragile, climate-vulnerable, and otherwise affected states are becoming more involved in this space, although much more remains to be done.

The conceptualisation of the linkages between climate change, peace and security varies between and within governments and donor agencies.

While knowledge of the links between climate change, peace and security is growing, a combination of political pressures and differing policy priorities has meant that national governments have taken different approaches to conceptualising climate security. Though there is some overlap, most governments broadly align with one of the following three frameworks to understand the climate-security dynamic:

Climate change as a “threat multiplier.” This framing sees climate change as a direct influence on security risks, e.g. by driving tensions over scarce resources, recruitment into armed groups, and population displacements in fragile settings. It has raised concerns amongst some countries, on the grounds that it securitises climate change and development agendas. However, its influence in policymaking and academic circles remains strong.

Climate change as a “risk multiplier.” This approach focuses on climate change as a factor in human security and social cohesion, suggesting that environmental shifts may have an influence on livelihoods, socio-political dynamics, and community resilience. While in some ways similar to the “threat multiplier” approach, it tends to raise fewer concerns of securitisation and, as a result, has broader acceptance amongst many affected countries. This framing can also offer clearer entry points for peacebuilding and development-oriented programming.

Climate as a sustainable development and environmental issue. Several influential countries – notably Brazil, China, India and Russia – maintain that climate change is first and foremost, or even exclusively, a sustainable-development and environmental issue, and therefore oppose the climate-security narrative. Here, sovereignty and the right of host governments to define their development and disaster response agenda are prioritised, and the barriers to conflict-sensitive programming are especially high.

These broad frames for understanding the impacts of climate change on the risks of instability and insecurity have meant that national policy responses to date have differed widely. They have also complicated efforts to create a common evidence base to understand dynamics at local and national levels, and have created partly divergent approaches to programming. A key goal of the 3D series was to build consensus towards a common framing across major donors and multilateral actors.
2. Current approaches, experiences and challenges

Policy and programmatic interventions should reflect the interconnected nature of climate change, peace and security, but challenges to integrated programming remain.

In science and scientific policy advice, the importance of integrated and contextualised analysis of climate-related security risks has long been recognised. Governmental actors are now increasingly moving to fund tools that can support these efforts. Climate- and conflict-sensitive risk assessments in fragile contexts, such as in the Lake Chad Basin or the Sahel region, have multiplied in the last few years, in part due to them being explicitly required in several UNSC resolutions, e.g. on Lake Chad, Somalia, Mali and Darfur (Vivekananda et al., 2020). Similarly, the CSM has developed a toolbox for the integrated analysis of climate-related security risks, which some bilateral and multilateral donors have adopted to inform their policies and strategies in the field.4

These initiatives have coincided with a growth of climate- and conflict-sensitive programming in a range of sectors. However, serious gaps persist, particularly in the area of long-term strategic planning, but also in more immediate policy-making. In particular, there is a lack of early warning capacity linked to programming in the areas of resilience-building, peacebuilding and disaster response. Additionally, fragmentation of approaches to deal with climate-related security risks across different government departments has inhibited joint planning and programming, leading to more ad hoc approaches than a broader strategic response.

The following factors contribute to this:

- **Varying conceptual approaches and methodologies**: Different governments and donor agencies use different frameworks and definitions of climate security, and at times these vary even within government departments and agencies. Methodologies and tools for assessing and addressing climate-related security risks can also differ significantly; for example, conflict units are often not familiar with climate vulnerability assessments, and climate units have not yet integrated conflict analysis or conflict-sensitive approaches into their work. There are insufficient analytical frameworks that look at conflict and climate risk (as well as issues of social exclusion and gender) in an integrated way. This results in widely varying products, both in terms of form and substance, which inhibits integrated programming and reduces opportunities for cooperation.

- **No clear institutional home for climate security**: Because it encompasses multiple mandates relevant to both development and foreign policy – and in some cases also defence – governments and donor agencies have found it difficult to identify a clear institutional home for climate security. In many cases, creating a shared space to address climate-related security risks has depended on individuals in specific agencies taking the initiative in an ad hoc manner, convincing colleagues of the issue’s relevance, and building the right expertise and connections with other agencies, experts and programming and funding streams.

• **Limited integration at the strategic level and buy-in from leadership**: At present, most integrated programming occurs at the working – rather than the strategic – level. Climate security often remains part of the mandate of specific offices in government (e.g., fragility and conflict or climate units), but is not included in strategic agendas at the highest level. Political buy-in for climate-security approaches is also often missing, which hampers the identification of opportunities for more integrated programming and coordination.

• **Lack of specialised and/or interdisciplinary capacities on the climate-conflict nexus**: It can be difficult to find technical specialists that have expertise simultaneously on climate and fragility and conflict – especially at the middle to top levels. Lack of expertise affects both substantive programming and the capacity to access funding streams to scale up existing programmes. The interdisciplinary nature of climate security also means it often competes with other priority areas, such as gender, human rights, migration, and provision of basic services. At the same time, these issues need to be woven into integrated climate, fragility, and conflict programming, as does contextual geographical understanding, requiring additional expertise.

• **Narrow use and sharing of data**: Integrated programming is often hampered by a lack of data and information sharing between and within governments, donors, and UN agencies. Meanwhile, in fragile and conflict-affected countries, the problem is often one of lack of data availability. Data is typically gathered for a narrow purpose – e.g. information on crop failure is used to assess potential malnutrition rates – inhibiting cross-cutting use. Not enough focus has been put on qualitative data, which is instead needed alongside quantitative data to understand linkages between climate change, peace and security.

• **Activity-based and sectoral financing mechanisms and monitoring and evaluation (M&E)**: Funding for both conflict and climate change adaptation programming has grown over the past years. However, funding for integrated programming that addresses both climate and conflict risks remains limited. With a few exceptions (see box 2 below), financing mechanisms tend to remain highly sectoral and activity-based, so that it is difficult to spend money on interventions that are not part of the initial programme design. Divergent timeframes are also problematic: short-term funding and M&E cycles are often inadequate to meet the long-term requirements of integrated climate-security programming. The same goes for M&E frameworks, which have not yet evolved to be able to capture both peace and resilience results and ensure that learning is consolidated and informs future programming.

One of the key advances under the recent UN reform has been the development of regional strategies for the peace and security pillar, which now has strategies for West Africa/Sahel, Central Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Western Asia. These offer important starting points for climate-security as well, given the transnational nature of the climate-conflict nexus and the resulting need to move beyond national frameworks. However, also in this case, the bulk of programming remains largely driven by national strategies and based on national prerogatives, which can lead to limited climate-security impact in
some areas. Looking forward, there is scope (and interest) to further refine the UN’s regional strategies towards more climate- and gender-sensitive programming.

Box 2: Funding for integrated climate security programming: some experiences

- Since 2017, the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has invested $63.4M through 29 projects in 20 countries towards climate security. By the beginning of 2020, 31 projects were being implemented by or in the pipeline of the PBF with a climate-security component. Climate-security is recognised as a key issue in the PBF’s next strategic plan 2020-2024 (Rüttinger, 2020; UN Peacebuilding, 2020).

- In 2017, the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace funded the “Climate Change and Security: Strengthening Resilience to Climate-Fragility Risks” project, the first-ever project explicitly conceived to address the complex interaction of climate and fragility risks by integrating climate change and peacebuilding programming in crisis contexts, implemented by UNEP, adelphi and Practical Action. The project developed and tested practical approaches to improve the resilience of communities to climate-fragility risks in Sudan and Nepal. At the global level, it aimed to improve analysis for integrated planning and programming to address climate-fragility risks through a series of tools and trainings (UNEP, 2017).

Progress is underway to integrate gender, human mobility, and social inclusion into climate-security programming, but this continues to be limited in scope and impact.

Climate-security impacts are not felt evenly across or within communities, and women are often more acutely or differently affected by shifts in climate. However, to date climate-security programming has rarely been undertaken with a gender and intersectional lens, and the lack of disaggregated data often means that information on climate impacts across population groups lacks the granularity needed for more tailored approaches. Yet, lessons from other sectors have shown that waiting to integrate gender means that this important area of analysis will be missing from the further development of thinking and political engagement, with significant impacts. Without concerted efforts, it is not automatic that gender will be addressed down the line.

There has been some progress on this front. For example, the recent publication of a report on the gender-climate-security nexus by UNEP, DPPA, and UNDP underlined an ambition to grow programming on gender and climate-security, providing an important analytical focus for these debates (UNEP et al., 2020). Additionally, donor governments and agencies are increasingly incorporating and mainstreaming the effects of climate change in other programming, including the women, peace, and security agenda (Smith, 2020).

Efforts to integrate social inclusion and human mobility into climate-security programming are also still limited. Institutional constraints are a key reason for this, as responsibilities for social inclusion are generally located in separate units of donor

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5 As of July 2020.
agencies and governments, complicating communication and coordination. Further, analyses of the links between social exclusion and climate security, particularly with a focus on specific contexts, are not widespread. Even in agencies with well-developed mainstreaming efforts, the horizontal linkages between cross-cutting issues remain incomplete.

3. Emerging trends and lessons learned

Emerging trends

The following emerging trends can be identified in research and programming on the linkages between climate, peace and security:

- **Cross-border and regional programming** is increasingly seen as an effective way to address the ways in which climate-security dynamics cut across national boundaries. For example, the PBF has added a number of cross-border programmes to its climate security portfolio. These focus on conflict drivers exacerbated by climate change by strengthening the dialogue between countries and communities on issues such as transhumance, natural resource management, migration and violent extremism (UN Peacebuilding, 2020; Rüttinger, 2020). However, regional programming is still limited, and particularly bilateral aid assistance continues to be disbursed at the national level, based on priorities agreed upon with the recipient country.

- **A focus on preventive action**: As the shocks caused by climate change grow in severity, bilateral and multilateral donor organisations and governments are recognising the need for anticipatory – rather than reactive – approaches. Increasing attention is on actionable foresight capacities that reflect global trends in a manner that can generate policy decisions. Especially in those settings where conflict risks are being driven in part by climate change, coupling crisis or conflict early warning with geospatial data, such as those provided by modern geographic information system (GIS) imaging, can also help detect shock events that could cause instability, such as crop failure, human displacement, large-scale land erosion and other environmental-induced crises (Day, 2020; Knudsen, 2020). The World Meteorological Organisation’s Regional Climate Centres can offer further data support to these efforts, while simultaneously strengthening regional perspectives and collaboration.

- **More partnerships and data sharing across institutions**: While the UN system has an enormous amount of relevant data available, data sharing between governments, donors, and UN agencies, and within them, has tended to be limited to date (Day, 2020). However, new partnerships and collaborations in this space are now emerging, with many potential benefits for integrated programming. Climate data, as well as more specific data or (proxy) indicators for specific climate-related security risks, are increasingly integrated into conflict and crisis early warning systems, and a growing number of multilaterals make their data more widely available (see box 3).
Increasing willingness in the UNSC to discuss climate security: There is increasing momentum at the UNSC to tackle the negative impacts of climate change on peace and security. In 2020 alone, language on climate change was integrated into Council outcomes on the Central African Republic, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, and West Africa, and three signature events on climate and security were organised by Germany, Niger and St. Vincent and the Grenadines during their Council Presidency (and one more took place in February 2021 during the UK Presidency). The rapid growth of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security (from 27 members when it was created in 2018 to 52 members in March 2021), and the establishment of an Informal Expert Group in July 2020 are clear signs of the increasing momentum for this in the UNSC. Apart from highlighting the urgency of the issue, the UNSC can serve as a forum to bring security, development, and diplomacy together, allowing for a better coordination of action on climate-related security risks and the increasing promotion of integrated programming.

Box 3: Examples of new partnerships for data sharing on climate security

- In Ethiopia, WFP is collaborating with the federal government and is piloting the use of weather-based data and information to put in place cash-based systems ahead of extreme weather incidents to bolster coping capacity and support disaster preparedness (WFP, 2019).

- UNEP’s Environmental Data Explorer, used by UNEP and its partners in the Global Environment Outlook report and other integrated environmental assessment, holds more than 500 different variables, as well as national, sub regional, regional and global statistics or as geospatial data sets, which are all publicly available.

- UNDP developed sets of Global Crisis Risk Dashboards, which are dynamic tools to analyse and understand global risks: from escalating conflicts to natural disasters. The dashboards can turn huge amounts of data into insightful visuals that are easy to analyse and use.

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6 The Group of Friends on Climate and Security was established in July 2018, with the goal of bringing together countries to develop responses to the impact of climate change on security policy, raise public awareness of climate-security linkages and boost the involvement of the United Nations in this area. It currently comprises 52 members; the US has recently declared its intention to join.

7 On 24 July 2020—the same day as the open VTC on climate and security spearheaded by Germany—ten members of the UNSC (Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Niger, Tunisia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the UK, and Vietnam) and three of the incoming members (Ireland, Kenya and Norway) issued a joint statement affirming that an Informal Expert Group would be convened “to assist the Council to achieve a more comprehensive and systematic approach on climate-security risks in situations on the ground”.


8 See: [https://geodata.grid.unep.ch/](https://geodata.grid.unep.ch/)

Lessons learned

In recent years, an increasing number of donors have started to align their understanding of climate-related security risks with the “risk multiplier” framework, which locates climate risks within a broad set of social dynamics and opens up space for developmental and peacebuilding responses (see section 1). Building on this, a growing number of pilot projects addressing these compound risks have been initiated. Some preliminary evaluations of the effectiveness of these projects are starting to emerge, highlighting the importance of the following elements:

- **Multi-scalar and multidisciplinary data, bringing together human security, environment, political, and gender-specific sources of information:** Evidence from existing programs emphasises the importance of assessing the interaction between climate change and socio-political, economic and demographic factors that can result in major livelihood and economic disruption, political instability and insecurity at different scales (e.g. local, national, transnational). A truly holistic analysis should consider the macro and micro dimension, balance the interests, needs and perspectives of different groups, nations and individuals, and employ different data collection methods – including quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews – as well as focusing group discussions to gather information from a variety of stakeholders. Joint analysis, information sharing and a collaborative and multisectoral approach is also needed to complete a comprehensive climate-security and integrated risk assessment, including actors in the areas of development, climate change, disaster risk reduction, and peace and security.

- **A focus on resource governance, with due attention paid to the risks of maladaptation:** The access, restoration and management of natural resources can serve as an entry point to achieve livelihood, adaptation and peacebuilding outcomes. Institutions and governance mechanisms that support the effective and equitable management of natural resources are not only important when it comes to addressing climate-related security risks directly, for example by enabling societies to respond to disasters, but can also contribute to increasing legitimacy and improving the often-damaged relationship between communities and the government. As the risks of maladaptation – worsening conflict risks by failing to account for them in programming – remain high particularly in areas experiencing fast-moving, climate-driven changes, it is also important to assess the potential negative side-effects early on in project cycles.

- **A clear set of objectives on inclusion and equitable access to resources and power:** Addressing patterns of marginalisation and exclusion from access to resources and power should be a key element of integrated climate-security programming. This includes working to ensure that governance mechanisms for natural resource management and conflict resolution include groups that were previously marginalised, for example on the grounds of gender, age, social status, ethnicity or religion. It should also encompass a focus on social cohesion, with activities aimed at strengthening dialogue and collaboration between conflicting groups, as well as between local communities and government authorities.

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10 See, e.g. Mercy Corps (2020); Mosello and Rüttinger (2020); USAID (2020).
There is increasing recognition among development donors and governments that to fully realise significant co-benefits for climate resilience, peace and security, integrated projects should go beyond climate- and conflict-sensitivity and simultaneously use climate change adaptation and peacebuilding approaches. Given the relative lack of integrated climate security programming that is being implemented or has been evaluated for sufficiently long time periods, it remains difficult to establish how effective current efforts are. Most donors and governments would like to see more relevant research and capacity-building in this area.

4. What’s next?

The conversation between development, security and diplomacy on climate-related security risks, especially in fragile contexts, has advanced significantly in recent years. Our research shows a growing willingness to integrate climate and security programming, and new analysis on the complex and contextual linkages between climate change, peace and security keeps emerging. More actors, including from affected countries, civil society and the academia, are coming into the debate. As acceptance and buy-in for the climate security agenda grows, the time has come to start delivering on it.

To this end, we recommend that bilateral and multilateral donors and governments:

- **Move towards integrated strategies that deliver on both climate resilience and peace:** The “risk multiplier” framework offers an opportunity to link climate-security work across the development, political and security sectors, potentially adding much-needed granularity to the concept of resilience. An important next step will be to translate today’s fairly broad understanding of the climate-fragility-security nexus into tailored programming, based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative data from the full range of sources (i.e. food security, demographics, population movements, natural resources).

- **Focus on inclusion and social transformation:** There is a growing recognition that security risks emanate from a range of inter-related social dynamics, particularly those around inequalities, differential access to power, and the governance of natural resources. Deep inequalities, including the marginalisation of women and youth, are not tangential to programming but should in fact be at the centre of future engagement. Learning from the successes of integrated approaches to date, future development and peacebuilding programming should identify immediate and longer-term structural changes necessary to combat the risks of deepening marginalisation, and place them as the core objectives of future programmes.
● Build multi-scalar responses bringing together local, national and regional dynamics: The transboundary nature of climate-related security risks calls for both multilateral and bilateral donors to focus on climate, conflict and insecurity dynamics, not just at the country-level but also across borders. The UN's increasing practice of regional and transborder programming offers a good way forward for transnational and regional programming, which could be adopted more directly by bilateral donors and governments, including through the UN's Peacebuilding Fund, and via Official Development Aid. Working together with regional bodies can help bring relevant actors to the table, improve data collection and sharing, and support the creation of long-term plans to address the causes of climate-driven insecurity and conflict, rather than its effects alone. Transborder programming should include local communities and actors, who can contribute their experiences of local specificities and cross-border challenges to inform and improve programming.

● Invest in learning and capacity building: Given the relatively nascent nature of the climate-security field, there is an important opportunity to build expertise in order to integrate climate security across sectors and large amounts of programming, in ways that mitigate unequal global power relations and create broader political will and buy-in. Especially in climate-vulnerable and fragile environments, more investments into knowledge sharing, research capabilities, and piloting and testing programmatic approaches are needed. M&E is another important area for further investment. Priority should be given to the creation and implementation of M&E indicators that capture results for all the intended and unintended outcomes and impacts by using multiple qualitative and quantitative methods. Benefits to local communities and participatory and emancipatory approaches should be brought to centre stage, reflecting the differential impacts of programmes on age, gender, ethnic and religious groups, as well as socially excluded communities, such as people with disabilities.

● Frame climate-security as a clear complement to the broader climate change discussion: To date, climate-security has been seen as a politically fraught issue, one where member states have expressed concerns that their development agendas might be “hijacked” by a security agenda. However, as the Wilton Park event highlighted, there is a growing recognition that the security risks posed by climate change are meaningfully affecting much of the development agenda, and are likely to grow in importance in the short term. Going into COP 26, more work could be done to frame climate-security as an important aspect of the broader debate, including in the SG’s Common Agenda later this year.
References


