WEATHERING RISK

Integrating Climate Security into Policies: Roadmap for Somalia

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This roadmap aims to guide Somali policymakers in streamlining climate security considerations into policy and to highlight priorities for support to donors. The roadmap targets institutions within the internationally-recognised Government of Somalia. Recommendations should be implemented with regard to the changing conflict situation, adjusted according to new conflict and climatic developments.
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Executive Summary

This country-level roadmap is designed to identify and outline challenges and opportunities for the integration of climate security into key policy and institutional processes within Somalia. These challenges and opportunities – as well as the short-, medium-, and long-term recommendations made to overcome and achieve them – were produced on the basis of policy analysis conducted throughout the year-long Mainstreaming Climate Security Considerations in Recovery Pathways research project, that brings together the UNDP Regional Hub for Arab States, the UNDP Climate Security Mechanism and the WFP Regional Bureau for the Middle East and Northern Africa under the auspices of the SDG-Climate Facility: Climate Action for Human Security project. Findings and recommendations were complemented by country-level stakeholders during a September workshop¹ and further substantiated by several key informant interviews, to ensure coherency in our approach and account for applicability at the national and subnational levels, inclusive of constraints. While this roadmap – and the recommendations it contains – are targeted primarily at the federal government of Somalia, the nature of the recommendations are such that international partners and actors are also likely to find entry points relating to their own mandate and opportunities to support their uptake.

Climate change and environmental degradation risks are deepening insecurity in Somalia. The country faces several climate hazards – such as high and rising temperatures, increasingly variable precipitation trends, and extreme weather events, including floods and droughts – that aggravate pre-existing stresses and weaknesses, in turn rendering the population even more vulnerable to climate change-related impacts. Large swathes of the population are dependent on climate-sensitive livelihoods, particularly nomadic pastoralism and crop cultivation. Additionally, decades of armed conflict and political instability have eroded the capacity of the state to respond to threats posed by climate change and protect the population from its nefarious consequences. In fact, as outlined below, the pressure exerted by climate hazards, particularly on livelihoods and food security, risks widening conflict and unrest:

- **Climate-change risks, especially heat stress and shifting rainfall patterns, threaten to further shift traditional grazing patterns and exacerbate resource competition between pastoralists and sedentary communities.**

- **Climate change threatens the viability of climate-sensitive livelihoods, which can indirectly aid non-state armed group (NSAG) recruitment and legitimacy.**

- **Climate-change risks can be exploited by powerful actors who capture vital and scarce resources or capitalise on climate insecurity to further political or personal interests, which can fuel community conflict.**

- **Climate change threatens to undermine livelihood, food and water security, which can lead to unmanaged mobility to urban centres already under pressure from climate stresses.**
To mitigate the risk of climate change exacerbating conflict and instability, climate security considerations need to be mainstreamed into sustainable development and post-conflict stabilisation and recovery measures. This task faces a number of challenges, including institutional obstacles such as corruption and nepotism, the emergence of informal networks of power and accountability underlying formal state institutions, and a disconnect between federal-level policy and governance processes and local-level realities. Nevertheless, a series of recommendations are presented to help address these challenges and encourage the examination of the linkages between climate change and conflict:

- **Engage in sensitisation programming in order to mainstream awareness of climate security among relevant stakeholders across various levels of governance and policymaking, including those on the frontline of implementation and action.**
- **Invest in key capacities (analytical, data and informational, conflict resolution and peacebuilding) at the federal, state, district and especially the local level – particularly where functioning (perhaps informal) systems and institutions already exist.**
- **Develop a national vision for tackling climate change that provides a clear institutional framework for coordination among different stakeholders and implementing agencies.**
- **Create a specific institutional or intergovernmental space for the purposes of climate security coordination and cooperation, building on already ongoing efforts within Somalia.**
- **Build upon recent efforts within regional bodies, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to create a regional learning facility on climate security-specific issues and measures.**
- **Advocate for greater mainstreaming of climate-related security risks and opportunities through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reporting system.**
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The project is a multi-partner platform focusing on the impacts of climate change on human security in the Arab region, especially in the context of countries in crisis. It brings together the League of Arab States (LAS), Arab Water Council (AWC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), to deliver climate-oriented solutions that address climate challenges and bring co-benefits across the SDGs. In doing so, it aims to scale up access to and delivery of climate finance, including through innovative partnerships with the private sector.

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Key Climate Risks

Somalia is exposed to numerous climate hazards, including rising temperatures, floods, droughts and cyclones. It is the second most vulnerable country in the world to climate change, according to the ND-GAIN Index.²

Increased temperatures

Somalia has one of the highest daily mean temperatures globally, at almost 30°C. This is expected to rise by 1.4°C-1.9°C relative to pre-industrial levels by 2050, and by 1.4°C-3.4°C by 2080.³ The number of very hot days, when the mean temperature is above 35°C, is widely expected to increase throughout the country, but the largest rise will be observed in Central Somalia.⁴ Under RCP 6.0, the central region will experience 93 additional very hot days per year by 2050 compared to 2000, a number that will rise to 152 by 2080.⁵

Rainfall variability

Rainfall levels are “low and erratic” in Somalia.⁶ Precipitation levels are dependent on interannual variability and are influenced by ENSO events.⁷ Projections indicate an annual increase in rainfall by 3 per cent up to 2050,⁸ and under RCP 6.0 annual precipitation rates are expected to reach 67.3 mm by 2080.⁹ However, rainfall patterns will be increasingly erratic, with high interannual variability resulting in wetter and drier years and often causing destructive flooding.¹⁰
Floods and droughts

Somalia also suffers from increasingly frequent and severe droughts and flooding. Since 2010, Somalia has experienced three major droughts. At the time of writing, the last five successive rainy seasons have failed, leading to the longest drought in 40 years. In the same period, these dry conditions have led to recurring and flash flooding, threatening to inundate vast areas of agricultural land and displacing many.

Cyclones

Coastal Somalia suffers from cyclones and severe storms. These cyclones and storms are expected to become increasingly intense, threatening lives, affecting livelihoods and causing extensive and expensive damage to infrastructure and coastal communities.
Climate-related Security Risks

Climate risks, such as precipitation changes and extreme weather events, threaten the availability of and access to vital natural resources for many Somalis. This undermines livelihoods, the availability of water and food and can contribute to migration and health pressures, all of which in turn further diminish resilience. These impacts compound pre-existing vulnerabilities and fragility, which in the case of Somalia stem from decades of political instability and armed conflict. The subsequent erosion of already-weak political institutions, livelihood strategies and social cohesion can strengthen NSAGs and intensify conflicts involving clans, NSAGs and the state.

Climate-change risks, especially heat stress and shifting rainfall patterns, threaten to further shift traditional grazing patterns and exacerbate resource competition among pastoralists and between pastoralist and sedentary communities. Approximately 49 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, with livelihoods predominantly split between nomadic pastoralism and crop cultivation. Changing availability and increased pressure on natural resources are leading to increased competition between pastoralists and sedentary communities, illustrated by pastoralists increasingly altering their traditional grazing routes and encroaching into traditional grazing lands via farmland expansion. Governance failures and the weakening of traditional conflict-management mechanisms (such as the Xeer system), and the diminished role of elders and other traditional leaders as interlocutors, exacerbate these challenges. Although these conflicts are not necessarily new – and the Xeer system is certainly not infallible or consistently effective at resolving all conflict in an equitable manner – they have become harder to resolve since conflict and dislocation have weakened customary dispute resolution and traditional resource-sharing mechanisms.
Climate change threatens livelihood insecurity, which can aid NSAG recruitment and undermine security. When climate change contributes to livelihood losses and resource scarcity, armed groups adapt their strategies and tactics accordingly.\textsuperscript{20, 21} That is because communities reliant on climate-sensitive livelihoods are particularly at risk of unemployment and food insecurity, rendering them susceptible to alternative livelihoods offered by armed actors.\textsuperscript{22} Furthermore, in the absence of strong state services and security provision, NSAGs such as Al-Shabaab have already capitalised on climate vulnerabilities and positioned themselves as providers of relief and justice in the context of rapid-onset disasters and impacted livelihoods.\textsuperscript{23} By building positive sentiment and legitimacy among the local population, these actors can increase their influence and boost recruitment while undermining the legitimacy of the government and the international community.\textsuperscript{24, 25, 26, 27} Livelihood insecurity in the face of climate shocks also pushes communities into the adoption of environmentally unsustainable practices such as charcoal production, thereby further contributing to the degradation of the natural environment.

Climate-change risks can be exploited by powerful actors who capture vital and scarce resources, which can fuel community conflict. Local and cross-border disputes may further increase the risk of broader conflict when exploited by local and national elites or clans.\textsuperscript{28} Power and access to resources often follow clan-based patterns, and ongoing armed conflict has exacerbated the impacts of inter- and intra-clan armed competition over natural resources.\textsuperscript{29, 30} In some instances, local and national elites have used rapid-onset disasters to strengthen their control over resources at the expense of weaker or marginalised groups. At the same time, clan-based power-sharing deals have also been found to contribute to the marginalisation of ethnic and social minorities, and in some cases facilitate manipulation by NSAGs.\textsuperscript{31, 32}

Climate change threatens to undermine livelihood, food and water security, which can lead to unmanaged mobility to urban centres already under pressure from climate stresses. While (voluntary) migration should be viewed as a long-standing, and in many cases effective, adaptation and development strategy, it may also become a driver of local conflict when it occurs in fragile circumstances.\textsuperscript{33, 34} The influx of those seeking alternative livelihoods, food and water security strains economic and social resources in host communities, increasing the risk of competition over basic services.\textsuperscript{35} In some cases, communities that have become permanently displaced due to flooding have settled permanently onto land that is not theirs, thereby contributing to tensions over ownership and access. In-migration can also change the demographic composition of a particular area and threaten the control of dominant groups.\textsuperscript{36} At the same time, arrivals may suffer from a lack of social cohesion, clan protection, and organised security in host communities, which, in turn, can play into the recruitment dynamics of armed actors such as Al-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{37}
Institutional Framework

Institutional Context

Somalia has been making important strides at the institutional level to manage and mitigate the worst effects of climate change. The National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) (2020), which was formally endorsed by the cabinet in February 2023, provides the institutional arrangements for climate-change governance at the federal level in Somalia. First, it first established the Directorate of Environment and Climate Change (DoECC), situated within the Office of the Prime Minister, mandated to formulate federal-level climate policy and coordinate climate activities undertaken by various federal institutions, federal member states (FMSes), local governments, international partners and other stakeholders. The office also serves as UNFCCC National Focal point and the National Designated Authority (NDA) for the Green Climate Fund. When Somalia’s new President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was sworn into office in May 2022, one of his first acts was to elevate the importance of the climate-change agenda, replacing the directorate with a federal Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, active since August 2022. This new ministry and its mandate represent an opportunity to significantly expand Somali capacities with regards to climate change.

A high-level policy coordination body – the National Climate Change Committee (NCCC) – was similarly established in 2020, responsible for coordinating and supervising the implementation of the NCCP. This committee is a multi-stakeholder platform comprised of the prime minister, the then-director general of the DoECC (now minister), sectoral ministries, directors of governmental agencies, member states’ ministers for environment, the private sector and civil society organisations. Alongside the NCCC sits the Cross-Sectoral Committee on Climate Change (CSCC), which brings together officials from across government working on climate change for the purposes of information exchange, consultation and generating agreement regarding the government’s response to climate change. Its primary functions include serving as a cross-sectoral forum for the exchange of ideas, the coordination of sector-specific and cross-sectoral design and implementation of activities, including advising evaluation outcomes and future directions of the NCCP, and addressing the cross-cutting and social aspects of climate change.
Similarly, the Somali Disaster Management Authority (SoDMA) was recently reinstated as part of the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation (MoIFAR), forming a key interlocutor between disaster-management efforts at the federal and state levels. Other notable institutions at the federal level that possess a mandate relevant to the climate security nexus within Somalia include the Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture, the Ministry of Water and Energy, the Office of the National Security Advisor, and the Ministry of Internal Security.

With regards to security-related matters, the main institutions responsible for maintaining security are the Ministry of Defense (MoD), which oversees the Somali National Army (SNA), the Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS), which oversees the Somali Police Force (SPF) and the Darwish Police (a federal paramilitary police) and, at the FMS level, the State Ministries of Internal Security, which oversee the state police. The Office of National Security (ONS) sits under the Office of the President and is responsible for policy coordination and convening the National Security Council, while at the FMS level, each state house has a state security office, responsible for convening the state security councils. The security sector in Somalia generally faces serious capacity issues. The National Security Architecture that was agreed in 2017 is, for instance, yet to be fully implemented as part of the federalisation of Somalia, and much emphasis has been placed on force generation as opposed to capacity building and civilian oversight. The SNA is, moreover, not a wholly centralised outfit, as loyalties are often determined by clan membership. As such, it has been criticised for being more of a conglomeration of militias than a functional and coherent national army.

Civilian oversight over the security forces remains very limited. The National Intelligence Agency technically sits under the MoIS but tends to operate independently. It suffers from capacity issues; it has also widespread Al-Shabaab infiltration and is highly politicised. A plethora of comparable challenges face the SPF, mandated to provide law enforcement and internal order through the MoIS. In reality, however, the ministry has little policy or oversight function over the SPF. This essentially means that any normal administrative processes of oversight, whether related to policy or funding, are circumvented or largely ignored. At the FMS level, where state police forces are being slowly introduced, there has been a general reluctance to disband state-level militias in a bid to curtail perceived centralisation attempts by Mogadishu, making the security landscape extremely complicated, whereby most security providers are actually operating informally.

Many areas within Somalia have limited state presence, and many areas remain outside of state control. In practice, the SNA and its regional and international military partners are often the main providers of security, although at the village levels, many communities have their own local militias to defend themselves. Recent successes achieved by the SNA against Al-Shabaab – supported by local militias and the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) – have seen territories previously controlled by the group returned to the FGS, such as in Hirshabelle. The extent to which these forces will be successful in holding more recently captured areas is, however, uncertain.

Over the course of the last decade or so, the FGS has – often in partnership with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) – drafted a flurry of legislation and strategies to guide stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts within its territories. These include, for instance, a national strategy and action plan for preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) in Somalia, the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS), which integrates PCVE into conventional military and security activities, the Defection Rehabilitation Program (DRP), which provides a pathway to reintegration for disengaged former Al-Shabaab fighters, the National Stabilization Strategy and the Wadajir Framework for Local Governance, among others. The scope, however, for these strategies to recognise the role played by climate change – and to actively consider climate adaptation and mitigation activities as mechanisms whereby human security can be improved – is notable. There is, for example, an opportunity to work with security-oversight institutions to mainstream climate change into security policies and threat assessments, particularly through the ONS and state security offices, but this will require awareness raising, sensitisation efforts and capacity building.
Climate Security Integration

Degree of integration

Despite the significant advances in seeking to better manage climate change and its effects, challenges remain in maximising the effectiveness of institutional responses to the frequently interconnected issues of climate and security, including at the policy level. There exists, for example, very little conceptual or practical interconnection among climate policies – be they adaptation or mitigation-oriented – and strategies relating to peace, conflict and security. Despite the incipient institutional infrastructure described above, policies, processes and guidelines are still developed in a siloed manner. This means that, although there is some limited awareness of the intersection of climate change, human insecurity and conflict in policy documents, climate-related priorities and objectives set at the federal level (such as in, for instance, the Updated Nationally Determined Contribution or National Adaptation Plan of Action) tend to still not sufficiently account for this relationship at strategic and programmatic levels. Conversely, development, stabilisation and security strategies tend not to sufficiently integrate the potential role that adaptation or mitigation activities could play in contributing to community resilience for the purposes of peace and stability.\textsuperscript{48,49} Bringing together the appropriate constellation of actors and sets of expertise needed to, first, define context-specific climate-related security dynamics, and second, design integrated policy responses to address these, remains a challenge. This is sometimes also inhibited by a lack of trust between certain actors and sectors, such as the security sector, which is perceived by many as secretive and non-transparent.\textsuperscript{50}
Challenges to integration

CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

Furthermore, key technical capacities crucial for climate security-sensitive policy and programme design are often lacking (both at the federal and subnational levels). Early warning systems and data or information monitoring services currently active in Somalia – such as the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) – are led and implemented by external actors, with inhouse capacity still insufficient to properly embed such forecasting and monitoring services in national institutions. Capacities to develop, for instance, anticipatory action systems responsive to a multi-hazard risk landscape remain, therefore, limited.\(^51\) Standardised analytical capacities and approaches needed to map and understand how climate-related factors may embed themselves in sub-national conflict systems (i.e. conflict mapping approaches) are also often lacking, thereby prohibiting the effective mainstreaming of climate-related security concerns across policies and strategies.\(^52\) Additionally, limited capacity at the local and district levels also hinders the effective transposition of national-level policy frameworks and objectives into locally relevant and actionable plans and strategies, making actual implementation difficult.

INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

In addition to challenges in policy formulation and implementation, Somalia faces several important institutional challenges that seriously affect its capacity for mainstreaming climate security considerations. First, corruption and clientelism continue to characterise every sector and level of government, with elite capture of institutions and offices sustaining mostly clan-based networks of power and accountability underlying formal state institutions.\(^53\), \(^54\) This has hampered the endeavors of decentralised decision-making, with some having criticised state-level leaders for possessing almost unilateral powers over provincial and district-level administrations and governments, and for exercising undue degrees of control within their polities.\(^55\) Second, some have argued that federal Somalia has served to federalise and institutionalise clans rather than citizens, evident in how the country’s five FMSes were established on the basis of clan majority. This has led to institutionalised competition between FMSes over border demarcations and access to resources.\(^56\)

Third, significant centre-periphery contestation remains between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the FMSes, partially as a consequence of as-of-yet undefined institutional responsibilities between the two levels of government within the constitution. Somalia is undergoing a critical phase of state building and stabilisation requiring negotiated settlement on allocation of power and distribution of resources, coupled with the necessity of preventive and mitigatory measures for recurrent conflicts and protracted droughts. Since 2012, Somalia has been under a provisional federal constitution that establishes the country as a federation but leaves many important details of the federal arrangements to be negotiated by the stakeholders. Since then, there has been some progress in setting up the federal system, most notably the establishment of FMSes. However, the status of FMSes still remains de facto without necessary endorsement of the federal parliament. Additionally, while the provisional constitution does set out some principles and mandates for federal-state cooperation, most aspects of the distribution of powers and resources remain unresolved. The allocation of powers remains highly contested, which is a central source of conflict between the FGS and FMSes. In addition to this vacuum, the matter of federal-state cooperation in key areas of public policy, governance and service delivery is severely affected by a lack of technical understanding on intra-governmental relations and the absence of requisite platforms for dialogue at the depth and regularity necessary to sustain progress and capacity development.

This has contributed in part to a significant disconnect between federal-level policy, governance processes and local-level realities.\(^57\) Despite customary governance mechanisms involving tribal elders or Islamic judicial authorities enjoying substantial local support and legitimacy, these tend not to be integrated into, or connected with, formal processes of governance.\(^58\) This points to a broader disconnect between the local and the federal, which extends into economic realms too. Informal revenue generation has in some locations been recorded as a – if not the – major source of income for financing the delivery of local public goods.\(^59\)
Recommendations

Given the various climate risks facing Somalia, including floods, droughts, cyclones, sea level rise and rising temperatures, and the effect they have and will continue to have on livelihoods and social cohesion, it is essential that the government deepens its actions on climate security within key climate and environment- and peace and security-related policy and institutional processes. However, these policies and processes remain too disparate, and capacity constraints inhibit real progress in confronting these challenges. Put together, compounding climate and conflict-related insecurities risk further amplifying insecurity and worsening fragility in the country. The recommendations presented below are meant to provide Somali policymakers at the regional and national level with suggested actions to begin to tackle some of the policy and process challenges. However, the challenges need to be addressed with the support of the international community, and thus these recommendations are relevant for donors at the national, regional and international level.

Immediate

Donors should embed key priorities within country plans and strategies.

The importance of advancing this roadmap, in consultation with country stakeholders themselves, cannot be overstated. Climate security is a threat to Somalia, affecting various aspects of Somalis’ lives, and is likely to further undermine already stretched resilience capabilities. The challenges are widespread yet interconnected, with many different areas needing to be addressed coherently and simultaneously. In support of that, a comprehensive strategy and framework to coordinate climate security action is needed at the national level. Creating this will help guide both domestic and international policy and programming to address the multi-faceted and complex climate-peace-development-humanitarian nexus that exemplifies climate security issues in Somalia. This Integration Roadmap is a first step to that effect but needs to be continued and finalised. UNDP and WFP are well positioned to support national actors in doing so. Further, donors’ own Somalia country plans and strategies should reflect the priority areas presented in the Somalia Climate Security integration roadmap so as to align donor action and resources with country needs and priorities.

SUGGESTED ACTIONS:

• Provide support to country team offices to develop national consultation processes in collaboration with key government stakeholders, in order to review this roadmap’s findings and recommendations towards finalisation.
• Review country strategies and plans, as well as ongoing programming, and embed roadmap recommendations accordingly.

Short-term

Engage in sensitisation programming in order to mainstream awareness of climate security among relevant stakeholders across various levels of governance and policymaking.

As awareness of climate security and specific climate-related security-risk mechanisms are currently not strongly reflected within key policy and strategy outputs produced in Somalia, sensitising policy and decision makers – as well as the public at large – within Somalia to these risks is paramount.
Such sensitisation programming should be targeted at technical staff in both climate and environment-related and peace and security-related sectors and agencies, such as the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, the Ministry of Energy and Water, the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MoIFAR), the MoIS and attendant military, police and maritime authorities. Moreover, engaging in this kind of training for civil society actors, NGOs, and others working on resolving conflicts (such as community elders) is equally critical, as these entities are often on the frontline of implementation and action. Several caveats should be considered when designing and implementing such programming, however: sensitisation programmes should ideally be made issue- or geography-specific to help build appropriate coalitions of actors across scales and sectors for the purposes of mitigating climate-related security risks. Incorporating and engaging actors who may not typically interact with one another beyond their sectoral silos together in the same room to build common ground is likely to have notable convening co-benefits, aside from its main capacity-building purpose. This could be used as a first step in creating a like-minded network of actors to assist in mainstreaming climate security considerations. Specifically, this would include inviting local-, district-, state- and national-level decision makers and technical staff, as well as a much greater degree of horizontal interaction between sectors and ministries and neighboring countries.

Second, emphasis within these capacity-building endeavors should not be on a top-down knowledge dissemination exercise. Instead, these activities should be focused on the co-development of knowledge with attending stakeholders. Pre-existing local knowledge of the links between climate and conflict – while perhaps not framed using international or academic nomenclature – is likely already in place in some capacity, and can help bring about concrete, locally relevant definitions of climate security, which remain somewhat absent in what remains a currently nascent field of research. The use of participatory mechanisms and methodologies that engage civil-society actors and other non-state entities is likely to help achieve this.

Finally, it is critical that capacity-building efforts do not take place in isolation of broader integration efforts. While raising awareness of the relationship between climate change, human insecurity and conflict is essential, it is equally as important to ensure that trainees have a clear and immediate opportunity to operationalise their learnings into their day-to-day operations and activities. It is therefore imperative that, first, capacity-building efforts are tailored to the specific professional and operational contexts of the trainees, and second, that training efforts contain a perhaps participatory component dedicated to the development of a specific work plan with concrete actions that can thereafter be adopted and followed up on.

SUGGESTED ACTIONS:

• Conduct training needs assessments (TNAs) among technical staff in the new Ministry of Environment and Climate Change (at the national level), the MoIS; military, police and maritime authorities and within FMS-level counterparts to map out a clear picture of which climate security-related capacities and understandings are lacking.

• Develop a climate security sensitisation and capacity-building teaching module responsive to identified capacity gaps in partnership with the new Ministry of Environment and Climate Change in the form of a training manual and workshop.

• Following this, develop a sensitisation campaign for ministerial counterparts at the FMS level and among relevant district-level officials to improve knowledge and capacities across multiple levels of government. These efforts should be:
  – Tailored to specific geographic or thematic issues in order to maximise the convening co-benefits of such an exercise, thereby beginning the process of building multi-scalar coalitions and networks of likeminded actors.
  – Inclusive of a diverse set of actors from across scales, both state and non-state.
Invest in key capacities (analytical, data and informational, climate change, conflict mapping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding) at the federal, state, district and especially the local level – particularly where functioning systems and institutions already exist.

Although investments have recently been made in improved information management and early-warning systems (predominantly as part of the newly refurbished SoDMA), gaps remain with regards to strengthening key surveillance and monitoring capacities for the purposes of climate and weather forecasting, disaster-risk management and anticipatory action. A potentially important component of this capacity building could focus on ensuring analytical and forecasting capacities currently located in actors external to government are better embedded within and owned by state actors. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)-led Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), for instance, which produces regular assessments and reports on the state of food and nutritional security within Somalia, is an example of the type of external capacities that should eventually become situated within appropriate ministerial bodies. Facilitating this would likely entail building and improving data management practices and storage capacities.

A similar initiative that holds utility for eventual mainstreaming comes in the form of the Peer Learning Program on Conflict Mapping, Conflict Analysis, and Planning for Peacebuilding (PLP), initiated as a part of the National Reconciliation Framework (NRF) and involving the Ministry of Interior, MoIFAR and UNDP Somalia. The PLP is a collaborative initiative of United Nations Systems Staff College (UNSSC), federal government, and federal member states of Somalia, aiming to build an inclusive infrastructure for peace at the federal, regional, subregional, district and grassroots levels. The programme is built upon the conflict-mapping exercise supported by the Reconciliation and Federalism Support (REFS) project and conducted by the Ministry of Interior, MoIFAR and line-ministries of the FMSes. The key purpose of the conflict-mapping exercise is to develop an empirical baseline on conflicts informing the formulation of reconciliation plans at different levels. Building on this empirical baseline, the integration of climate security considerations can inform the scope and nature of data collection, as well as feed into the development of conflict prevention components of the regional and district reconciliation plans. These plans seek to address the root causes of resource-induced and climate-related conflicts through community-based insider mediation at the local levels.

Developing a dynamic database on conflict mapping and analysis is a primary requirement to inform the conflict prevention strategies and actual interventions. In the Somali context it is especially critical to create an instrument that can help develop locally rooted infrastructure for peace. MoIFAR and UNDP are, for instance, planning to develop a Somalia conflict navigator as a platform and tool for mapping, planning and tracking of conflicts and interventions related to conflict prevention. Navigating through different stages of the overall value chain of peacebuilding, this navigator will be linked with regional and district level reconciliation plans from initial conflict mapping to early-warning to conflict and reconciliation tracking. Through this innovative model the link between early warning and early action or prevention would be strengthened and institutionalised by deepening the infrastructure for peace in Somalia, with a focus on mainstreaming the nexus approach at the conflict mapping, analysis, planning, implementation and tracking levels.

The PLP is an excellent example of building capacities for peace across different scales, and funding- and capacity-building efforts should generally be targeted to a much greater degree beyond exclusively the national level. Technical capacities particularly need to be strengthened in state- and district-level disaster management entities, such as the state ministries of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, where funding and capacity is particularly lacking. Furthermore, given the disconnect that often exists within Somalia between the federal, subnational and local levels, much more attention should be given to strengthening and linking to formal policy processes those crucial local institutions and capacities that already exist and that enjoy the support of local communities. Examples of this include insider mediation and traditional clan-based or Islamic court and justice mechanisms for conflict and dispute resolution, including those relating to environmental issues. These are often able to provide justice
much more effectively than “formal” judicial systems, meaning that linking and strengthening these – as well as linking them much more effectively into formal policy processes – is particularly important, especially in areas where Al-Shabaab is otherwise able to gain legitimacy and support through the provision of judicial capacity.66

Other types of activities that focus on the local level and that should be scaled up include participatory community-planning programmes, such as the Berghof Foundation’s Climate Security Action Plan programme implemented in selected districts. This programme focuses both on building climate security-related knowledge capacities of local partners and project implementers, as well as allowing local communities themselves to define problems and design solutions to these. Such programmes should be upscaled drastically, as building capacity at national and subnational levels is likely to take more time and climate-related security risks can, at a local level, provide immediate entry points for resilience building and inter-communal cooperation.67 Additionally, specific skill sets to be transmitted during such activities should focus on how to conduct climate security-sensitive baseline and context assessments, key frameworks and approaches for ensuring conflict-sensitivity, and what existing risk-reduction tools and programmes can mean for climate-related security risks specifically.68 Key international actors who could assist in the scaling up of such efforts include the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which can help coalesce international partners on the issues of climate change, peace and security in Somalia, building on initial investments made by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), as well as the UN’s Climate Security Mechanism (CSM).69

SUGGESTED ACTIONS:

• Build analytical and forecasting capacities relating to both climate and conflict currently found in external actors into the state level and beyond, especially local institutions supported by local communities. Specifically, investment should first be channelled towards FMS-level Ministries of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management and MoIFAR to build capacities related to risk reduction and resilience building (rather than exclusively reactionary disaster responses) as well as climate security-sensitive conflict mapping and response planning, including:
  – Data collection, storage, and management facilities and processes.
  – Evidence-informed early warning and anticipatory responses.
  – Linking climate-related data collection and analysis with the ongoing review of the National Reconciliation Framework (NRF) and National Stabilisation Strategy, specifically including the formulation of the Somalia conflict navigator.

• Create a central-funding mechanism and standardised guidelines (perhaps anchored in and produced by MoIFAR and the new Ministry for Environment and Climate Change) for the expansion of participatory community-planning programmes to promote local-community agency in solving problems related to climate security and reduce distrust and tensions between communities and the ministries. Specifically, this could entail:
  – A national-level funding mechanism for the purposes of community- or district-level climate security planning should be modelled on already existing cross-scalar financial mechanisms deployed by other countries for the purposes of incentivising local-level climate action, such as the People's Survival Fund (PSF) in the Philippines. Such a mechanism must, however, be accompanied by clear guidance and a standardised application process.
  – Lessons learned and best practices can be extracted from previous community-level climate security programming, such as the activities enacted by the aforementioned Berghof Foundation or UNDP Somalia’s efforts around the PLP. These activities should also, wherever possible, feed back into and inform higher level decision-making processes and mechanisms.
Medium-term

Develop a national vision for tackling climate change that provides a platform for coordination among different stakeholders and implementing agencies.

With the recent creation of the new Ministry for Environment and Climate Change (previously a directorate), the political will and mandate now arguably exist to pursue this endeavor much more effectively. While the NCCP (2020) represents an important first step towards outlining adaptation and mitigation priorities and needs and erecting a multi-level climate governance system, the latter in particular still requires a great deal of work.

An updated NCCP should therefore take several things into account. First, there is a need to align what can sometimes be deemed fairly disparate, disconnected and uncoordinated climate-change governance structures across sectors and scales. Climate change-related mandates are spread inconsistently across national-, state- and district-level governance bodies. Different district authorities, for instance, have different formulations of water and security focal points, approach endeavors such as peacebuilding in different ways and although the NCCP formally outlines some specific institutional frameworks and provisions (such as the creation of state and municipality-level committees on climate change), there are not always clear and direct lines of responsibility from district through to the state and federal level.\textsuperscript{70, 71} Moreover, the exact mandate with which these bodies are tasked remains largely undefined beyond “coordination of climate-change response actions” at their respective levels.

An updated NCCP would therefore provide a platform through which climate- and climate security-specific mandates of various ministries, governance units, and directorates (at both the national and subnational levels) could be elaborated and rationalised. Specifically, such a policy output could include coordination procedures for various actors with regards to programme design and implementation, processes and capacities for data and information transmission, storage, and access, and the creation of a specific institutional space for the purposes of climate security-risk management.

**SUGGESTED ACTIONS:**

- Update the NCCP to establish and adequately fund climate-governance structures and processes beyond the federal level and rationalise a more effective multi-level climate governance system. For mainstreaming climate security considerations specifically, such efforts should include:
  - The creation of clear lines of responsibility and climate security-specific policy instruments linking the local with the federal. This could be done through, for example, the top-down mandating of district- or community-level authorities to create local climate security action plans (LCSAPs), detailing a set of locally relevant adaptation, mitigation and disaster risk-management activities that have co-benefits for social cohesion, peace and security.
  - A clear delineation of how and where external actors are able to offer funding and capacity building support within such processes.

Integrate climate change- and climate security-related considerations into ongoing policy discussions and dialogues on allocations of power and “functional unbundling” between FGS and FMSs.

Create a specific institutional space for the purposes of climate security coordination and cooperation.
While the lack of a specific institutional space or issue-specific unit of governance with regards to climate security is not unique to the Somali context, Somalia is arguably where such a body is needed most (despite continuously facing a competing set of long- and short-term priorities). Efforts to institutionalise such a space within the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change are already underway as part of UNSOM environment and climate security activities, and support should be channelled towards such efforts while avoiding duplication elsewhere. A particularly important mechanism going forward will likely be the Pillar Working Group (PWG) on Climate Change and Environment that has emerged as part of the Somalia Renewed Partnership (SRP), which has a mandate related specifically to climate security.

The composition of such a body must crucially be reflective of the cross-scalar and cross-sectoral complexity of the intersection of climate change, human insecurity and conflict and insecurity within Somalia. This means that its makeup should be diverse in nature, including actors best-placed for disaster management, disaster-risk reduction and humanitarian response (such as SoDMA), those with a mandate to facilitate longer-term adaptation and resilience-building activities (such as the Ministry for Environment and Climate Change), and those with a security, conflict and peacebuilding-related mandate (such as local peacebuilding organisations, implementing partners and national level security actors including the MoIS). As of right now, it appears that the PWG on Climate Change and Environment’s membership is limited to the MoECC and the Ministry of Planning, Investment, and Economic Development (MoPIED) and does not include, for instance, MoiFAR.

Furthermore, the mandate of such a body should be multifaceted. First and foremost, its responsibilities would include improving cross-sectoral and cross-scalar coordination on matters relating to climate, development, peace and security. As the vast majority of policies, institutional processes and guidelines remain siloed in nature – and important climate-related policy outputs such as the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) do not contain sufficient conflict-sensitivity – such a unit could immediately take steps to identify key policies and entry points within them for where climate security considerations could feature and work to mainstream such concerns into relevant policies. Beyond climate and environment-related policies, the unit could also help facilitate the sharing of climate-risk information across all national and subnational government ministries so that climate sensitivity can be better built into development, peace and security policies, such as the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) framework and the Defection Rehabilitation Programme (DRP). Moreover, beyond coordination, the responsibilities of such a body should arguably include the development of a more robust multi-level implementation and partner framework that can aid the development of more coherent, multi-pillared programmatic efforts. A common programme framework that is capable of binding together multiple state and non-state actors into strategic partnerships with shared objectives, results monitoring and learning structures is likely needed to unlock the co-benefits of partnership on the ground.

Second, such a body could (likely in partnership with non-state partners) produce specific knowledge products on climate-related security risks in specific subnational contexts – such as the creation of community-led and district-specific climate security vulnerability profiles – to help aid future planning and programme design. Finally, such a body could also perform a convening function and form an institutional actor where future learning and capacity building exercises could take place, laying the groundwork for some of the recommendations made as part of the first recommendation.

**SUGGESTED ACTIONS:**

- Support efforts to establish and institutionalise a space for climate security cooperation and coordination within or involving the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change that engages political and technical leaders from FGS and FMSes, such as a ministerial working group on climate security, an intergovernmental task force on climate security involving the director generals (DGs) of relevant line ministries, or through the new PWG on Climate Change and Environment. Such an issue-specific platform could:
  - Act as the Somali climate security focal point and be the anchor for climate security-related capacity building and training initiatives.
Facilitate the creation of a common programming framework to enable strategic partnerships around climate security to more effectively translate into cooperation on the ground.

Produce (in partnership with international, national and local non-state actors) district-specific climate security risk profiles and other knowledge products to help disseminate knowledge of climate security dynamics across relevant national and subnational stakeholders.

- Map actors that are representative of the cross-cutting nature of climate-related security risks in Somalia and that should be a part of the composition of the issue-specific unit. Specific horizontal and multi-ministerial processes – such as information and data sharing relating to climate risks – could thereafter be mandated among relevant groups of actors.

Build upon recent efforts within regional bodies, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to create a regional learning facility on climate security-specific issues and measures.

Countries occupying the same regional space and that face similar biophysical risks and impacts have the potential to learn from one another’s responses and apply lessons learned in the development of their own responses. Countries such as Somalia in particular are able to learn from neighboring countries that arguably possess a greater degree of institutional sophistication and maturity, such as Kenya. The recently refurbished SoDMA, for instance, may be able to draw significant lessons from Kenya’s National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), a unit that has successfully designed and implemented integrated and conflict-sensitive approaches to drought management and disaster-risk reduction (see, for instance, the Ending Drought Emergencies Common Programme Framework).

Again, efforts are already underway at the regional level in this regard that should be strengthened and fully financed. The most prime example comes in the form of a communiqué produced as part of a high-level inter-ministerial event for IGAD countries at the margins of COP27, attended by the ministers responsible for climate change, peace and security from IGAD member states. This meeting successfully mandated the IGAD secretariat to set up a climate security coordination mechanism – to be housed at IGAD’s Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC) and to work in collaboration with IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms (CEWARN) – to prioritise capacity building of IGAD member states. It is not only critical that such a body is linked vertically to appropriate federal- and state-level governance architecture within Somalia to ensure a cross-scalar flow of information, but also that the creation of such a body is widely disseminated and expert organisations are provided a platform to share evidence and experiences.

SUGGESTED ACTIONS:

- Finance and create a regional learning facility to collaborate at the regional level with other states across the Horn of Africa region on climate security issues. Such efforts should be anchored in the aforementioned issue-specific governance unit in the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change.

- Promote this collaborative body and invite a wide range of organisations to share expertise. Specifically:
  - Identify successful examples of local-, subnational- and national-level climate security-related policy and programming (such as the aforementioned NDMA-run Ending Drought Emergencies Common Programme Framework in Kenya) and facilitate opportunities for learning and exchange.
While not unique to Somalia, this recommendation can be important particularly for fragile settings characterised by institutional challenges. Utilising the degree to which countries receive technical and financial support for drafting and implementing UNFCCC reporting requirements such as NAPs or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (through, for example, the Least Developed Countries Expert Group) represents an important lynchpin for mainstreaming climate-conflict and climate-peace considerations. In the absence of sometimes necessary technical, institutional and procedural capacities that precede the development of substantial cross-sectoral sustainable development and climate-change response strategies, externally facing mandated documents such as NDCs and NAPs are sometimes one of the few concrete policy and legislative platforms responding to climate change that exist within fragile contexts. They, therefore, form prime entry points through which considerations of climate security dynamics can be mandated, and where the potential co-benefits of specific forms of climate action in specific geographical and socio-economic contexts can be mainstreamed. Recent progress on the loss and damage front as a consequence of COP27 similarly offers an important entry point in this regard. It is essential that those working in the realms of climate, development peace and security advocate for the technical activities of the newly operationalised Santiago Network for Loss and Damage (SNLD) – such as conducting loss and damage needs assessments – to be conflict and climate security-sensitive, recognising the role that climate change-related conflict and instability has played in causing or contributing to economic and nutritional loss. The SNLD furthermore will likely form an important opportunity for the dissemination of funding, skills and capacities through networks of experts and expert organisations. These should include – particularly in fragile settings – those able to work at the intersection of climate science, climate adaptation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Securing the funding for such activities will prove key, and advocacy should focus on establishing these priorities for the longer-term.

SUGGESTED ACTIONS:

• Work to incorporate climate security considerations into concrete policy and legislative platforms, including NDCs and NAPs, and advocate for the technical capacities of the SNLD to be made conflict- and climate security-sensitive. Specifically:
  – Advocate and work together with relevant international partners to initiate a systematised and funded advocacy programme that can help build support and interest for the incorporation of standardised climate security considerations in UNFCCC reporting mechanisms among international stakeholders.
  – Work together with relevant international partners to initiate a structured advocacy effort to ensure that climate security-related technical capacities (such as integrated and climate-sensitive approaches to conflict prevention, transformation and peacebuilding) are considered as relevant types of technical assistance for the SNLD, and that actors and organisations able to provide this technical expertise are considered as relevant actors to include in the network.
Endnotes

1 This workshop consisted of a one-day discussion held in a hybrid format in Amman, Jordan, on climate-related security risks and challenges around their integration for all countries covered by the Mainstreaming Climate security Considerations Project. Stakeholders included government representatives, civil society, international actors and community-based organisations.


4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.


15 Ibid.


39 Interview with key information 1 2022.

40 Interview with key information 4 2022.

41 Interview with key information 1 2022.

42 Interview with key information 4 2022.


44 Ibid.

45 European Asylum Support Office 2021.


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